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Introduction
T he remuneration of executive directors of listed companies is an area that has
attracted wide interest from investors, regula-
tors and the media. Corporate disasters, such
as Enron in the United States (US) and
Marconi in the United Kingdom (UK), have
heightened awareness of the issues arising
from the way in which directors are paid. In
the UK, it has been the subject of continued
regulation: for example, Department of Trade
and Industry (2002).
Academic interest in directors’ remunera-
tion has also been considerable. Its focus has
been on using archival data to establish the
relationship between the level of pay and
factors such as corporate performance or
board composition. Such research has proved
conceptually important and added consider-
ably to our understanding of executive remu-
neration issues. However, the emphasis on
archival data has led to research that has
circled around a question of interest both to
academics and practitioners: how are execu-
tive directors’ remuneration policies and pack-
ages determined?
This issue has been raised by several
researchers over the last two decades. For
example, Kerr and Bettis, in a study which
examined archival data for a sample of
Fortune 500 companies, noted the following:
It is difficult not to concur with critics who
claim that there is no rational basis for the com-
pensation paid to top management . . . research
thus far has failed to provide solid evidence to
refute the charge. Perhaps what is needed are
studies that look closely at the process by which
boards make compensation decisions. Most
research has attempted to infer the critical vari-
ables in the process by examining decision out-
comes in relation to performance. As a result, we
continue to guess at the inputs to the compen-
sation decision. Given the importance of the
topic and of the corporate governance process in
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general, it is clear that we must get closer to the
process of top management compensation if we
are to understand it. (Kerr and Bettis, 1987, p.
661)
This paper contributes to the executive remu-
neration literature by presenting findings from
an exploratory study which directly addresses
the question of how directors’ remuneration
policies and packages are set. A qualitative
methodology was used, interviewing the pro-
tagonists in the remuneration-setting process
at two listed UK utilities. The research find-
ings suggest that aspects of both economic and
social-psychological approaches are relevant
in understanding how directors’ remuneration
is set.
Background
In the UK, as in many jurisdictions, the remu-
neration of executive directors is determined
by a remuneration committee comprising 
non-executive directors. The remuneration
committee will take advice, as appropriate,
both internally and from external consult-
ants (Combined Code, 1998). Although each
company will select different remuneration
policies and packages, most remuneration
contracts for executives tend to be structured
so as to include a base salary element and 
performance-related awards for both annual
and long-term performance (Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, 2000). Researchers investigating
directors’ remuneration have been interested
both in the absolute level of the remuneration,
and also in the way in which the different 
elements are structured.
Previous research has viewed the phenom-
enon of directors’ remuneration through two
distinct lenses: economic theories and social-
psychological theories. Economic explana-
tions have revolved around the actions of
rational man, acting either as a self-serving
individual, or as a participant in the labour
market. Social-psychological explanations
consider the motivations driving the protago-
nists, and the relationships between them. The
following paragraphs expand on these issues
insofar as they inform the empirical work
reported in this paper.
Economic theories
Economics is the dominant paradigm in
research into executive remuneration, and
within this paradigm the most commonly
espoused theory is agency theory. Agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisen-
hardt, 1989) takes the view that the goals of
directors (agents) and the shareholders who
own the company (principals) differ. Directors
are assumed to be effort-averse and risk-
averse and, if left to their own devices, would
run companies to suit their own purposes.
Agency theory sees the remuneration contract
as one way to ensure that the directors act in
the shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, con-
tracts are devised which include an element 
of performance-related pay, with the perfor-
mance measure(s) being set so as to coincide
with the shareholders’ needs.
Agency theory reflects the behaviour of man
as an individual. Other economic theories use
market forces as their explanation of directors’
pay. Proponents of labour market theory
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1996) argue that directors’ pay
can be explained in terms of the supply of and
demand for top executives. In this context,
Ezzamel and Watson (1998) refer to the need
to pay the “going rate” to executives, in order
to motivate and retain them.
Social-psychological theories
In the context of this research, the main social-
psychological explanation for the phenome-
non of directors’ remuneration is institutional
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which
considers the isomorphic pressures that 
influence companies to act in similar ways.
Such pressures may arise due to regulatory
influence (coercive isomorphism) or due to
imitation of “best practice” (mimetic isomor-
phism) or be passed on through the pro-
fessional practices of consultants (normative
isomorphism).
Isomorphic pressures may thus provide 
a coherent explanation for the homogeneity 
of companies’ remuneration practices (New
Bridge Street Consultants, 2002a, 2002b).
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, p. 275)
discuss the isomorphic pressures which may
lead to similarity in pay structures between
companies and, more particularly, within
industries. They note that many industries
have distinct pay patterns and suggest that
isomorphism, in particular, practices passed
on by consultants, might be an explanation of
this.
Linked closely to institutional theory are
theories of legitimacy. Legitimacy relates to
the way in which organisations seek to accord
with society’s expectations in order to gain
acceptance. It is defined by Suchman as “a
generalized perception or assumption that the
actions of an entity are desirable, proper or
appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, beliefs and definitions”
(1995, p. 574).
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Legitimacy has relevance to directors’ remu-
neration as society’s perception of the remu-
neration may affect the company’s status in
the domains from which it draws resources.
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) suggest
that one reason companies adopt compensa-
tion practices that are widely accepted in their
industry is to gain legitimacy. If a company is
seen as being over-generous in paying its
directors, its reputation may suffer and it may
lose valuable support. The use of remunera-
tion consultants can also be seen as a legit-
imising device, in that they are external to the
company, and so their advice is presumably
independent (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia,
1998).
Directors’ remuneration is determined by
remuneration committees, but, obviously, it
has an impact on the individuals who are
being paid. Proponents of equity theory
(Adams, 1963; Miller, 1995) argue that employ-
ees consider the ratio of their inputs (how hard
they work) to their outputs (how much they
get paid) and then compare that ratio to a 
referent, for example another employee, or 
an individual in another, similar company.
Should they conclude from this comparison
that they are treated more or less favourably
than others, equity theory asserts that they
will respond by raising or lowering their work
efforts, in order to re-establish equity.
It is worth considering another theoretical
perspective through which directors’ remu-
neration can be considered – decision theory.
Decision theory is a broad field and only two
aspects of it are discussed here: anchoring-
and-adjustment, and bounded rationality.
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) suggests that
in many situations people make numerical
estimates by starting from an initial value (the
anchor), and adjusting this to yield a final
answer. Tversky and Kahneman’s findings
show that the adjustments made are usually
insufficient: different starting points yield dif-
ferent estimates, which are biased towards the
initial values. The relevance of this to execu-
tive remuneration is that remuneration com-
mittees often have a figure given to them as a
starting point, either previous years’ pay, or
salary surveys, and their judgement may be
influenced by this anchor.
The second aspect of decision theory that
appears applicable is bounded rationality
(Simon, 1957). This suggests that human
beings have limited capacity and cannot ob-
tain, and could not cope with, all the possible
information needed in order to take a fully
informed decision. Accordingly, they obtain
sufficient information to come to a decision,
and base their decision on their model of the
world obtained from that limited information.
In the context of the remuneration-setting
decision, a huge amount of information is
potentially available, and it might be that 
busy individuals “satisfice” their decision by
obtaining only part of the available informa-
tion, and making their decisions based on only
part of that.
A further explanation of interest is con-
tingency theory. Proponents of contingency
theory (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987;
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Finkelstein
and Boyd, 1998) argue that for companies to
be effective in realising their intended strat-
egies, there has to be an alignment between
the strategy and the company and the envi-
ronment in which it operates. In terms of
remuneration, this suggests that remunera-
tion policies for directors should reflect the
company’s overall strategy. If they do not, the
lack of fit is likely to impede the effective
implementation of strategy.
The various theories discussed above have
no common thread other than the fact that
each has been used in previous research to
explain one or more aspects of directors’
remuneration. The findings reported in this
paper suggest that none of the theories on its
own provides sufficient explanation of the
phenomenon, but that together they might
begin to explain how remuneration com-
mittees determine the pay of their executive
directors.
Research methodology
The aim of the research is to investigate the
factors influencing remuneration commit-
tees in the way in which they set directors’
remuneration. Specifically, this paper exa-
mines contextual factors that impact on the
remuneration, the choice of schemes, and the
influence of the market. To do this, this
research takes a qualitative approach, a novel
methodology in the area of research into direc-
tors’ remuneration, as most previous studies
have analysed archival data (Tosi et al., 2000).
As an exploratory study into a process, the use
of case studies is an appropriate methodology
to adopt for the research (Harris and Ogbonna,
2002; Bonoma, 1985).
The two companies forming the case studies
are both utilities (in the electricity, gas, water
or telecoms sectors of the market), quoted in
the FTSE 350. In considering directors’ remu-
neration in the UK, utilities have an interest-
ing place in history. It was primarily the
generous packages awarded to the directors of
the newly-privatised utilities that led to
adverse public and government attention that
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ultimately resulted in the setting up of the
Greenbury Committee, which produced its
influential report on directors’ remuneration
in 1995.1 Utilities were the perceived home of
the original “fat cats”, although much has
changed in the sector since that time.
A second reason for choosing utilities as the
context for the case studies is that profits in
that sector are heavily influenced by a regula-
tor (Ofgem, Ofwat, Oftel), who makes a regu-
latory review at five-yearly intervals and
effectively wipes out the companies’ profit
potential in their regulated businesses, re-
setting prices at a level which is intended to be
sufficient only to cover the cost of capital
(Ofwat, 2002). As at least part of remuneration
is linked to profit in the majority of companies
(New Bridge Street Consultants, 2002b), the
way in which companies structure their remu-
neration to adapt to this constraint is also of
interest.
Because of the impact of the regulator on
profits, utilities in the UK often choose to
expand their activities beyond those within
the regulator’s remit. This may be done by
diversifying into related businesses, or by
expanding their geographic reach. Individual
utilities have adopted very different business
strategies in this respect.
The data source for identifying sample com-
panies was the PricewaterhouseCoopers Cor-
porate CD Register. The initial searches were
made on the database dated June 2001. In
total, 15 utilities were identified. The two
companies for the pilot studies were selected
from these. Both were “cold called” in Decem-
ber 2001 to determine their interest in the
study, and both agreed to participate.2
The companies were originally selected
because some or all of their non-executive
directors sat on the remuneration committees
of other listed companies. It was felt that inter-
viewing individuals with experience of differ-
ent contexts would add to the richness of the
data, and this indeed proved correct. Both of
the non-executive directors interviewed sat on
several boards, and during the interviews they
brought experience from those other boards
and contrasted it with the situation in the case
study companies.3 The remuneration consul-
tants also were asked to compare their experi-
ence in the case study companies with their
experience in other companies, as were the
chairmen and those executives who had
outside experience.
Coincidentally, there were other similarities
between the companies, which proved valu-
able for the research. In each of the companies,
there had been no award made under the
long-term remuneration plan for a period of
several years. Further (and related in part to
the previous point), each of the companies had
changed its long-term remuneration plan sig-
nificantly in the previous three years, and had
changed its annual bonus plan slightly in that
period. Finally, each of the companies had
changed its remuneration consultants within
the last two years.4 Discussion of these
changes presented a useful focus for the inter-
views, and provided an excellent source of
information about the processes.
In each company, semi-structured inter-
views were carried out with the following
people involved in the remuneration-setting
process:
• chairman of the remuneration committee
(“Chairman”5);
• another remuneration committee member
(“NXD”);
• human resources director (“HR”);
• chief executive officer (“CEO”); and
• remuneration consultant employed by the
company (“Consultant”).
In Utility 1, the compensation and benefits
manager (“Comp”) was also interviewed.
The interviews were conducted between 
the end of December 2001 and May 2002. 
Each lasted between approximately 30 and 75
minutes (with the CEOs being able to spare the
least amount of time), and took place at the
various offices of the individuals being inter-
viewed. The interviews were semi-structured,
in that a broad interview brief had been pre-
pared. However, being exploratory in nature,
the discussions ranged widely around those
questions. Further, as Hill (1995) noted, in
interviewing people of status the balance of
power, normally with the interviewer, is with
the interviewee. Accordingly, the conversa-
tions were often very discursive, although the
core elements of the interview brief were
always covered.
All of the interviews except one were taped
and transcribed. In addition, extensive notes
were taken during the interviews, and were
written up as soon as practical after each inter-
view. Transcripts have been reviewed by the
interviewees, who made some minor amend-
ments, none of which changed the substance
of the transcript.
Coding of the transcripts is underway, and
is being facilitated using Nvivo. Data coding
commenced with the researcher drawing up a
preliminary list of possible codes, based on a
review of the literature. As the coding pro-
gressed, this list was altered and extended to
include “in vivo” codes.
In addition to interviews, data were gath-
ered about the case organisations and their
institutional environments from the following
sources: the latest annual report and accounts
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and the one for the prior year; internal docu-
mentation (where available); scheme docu-
mentation for each company; remuneration
consultants’ reports for each company; and
analysts’ reports on the companies.
Key findings
The findings reported in this paper focus on
the strategic issues faced in setting the execu-
tive directors’ remuneration and, in particular,
on the considerations taken into account in
making the changes, mentioned above, to their
remuneration policies. The following issues
are addressed:
• the link between corporate strategy and
remuneration policies;
• the choice of the form of the long-term
remuneration scheme;
• the use of market comparators; and
• the influence of history.
The link between corporate strategy and
remuneration policies
As stated earlier, both of the case study com-
panies had changed their remuneration po-
licies in recent years. From the interviews in
both companies, this appeared to be for the
same two reasons: human resources (HR)
explanations and strategic explanations.
HR reasons
One of the reasons for the change was the fact
that the executives had not received a payout
from the long-term schemes for several years.
This was seen as a motivational issue. Inter-
viewees put the argument that pay is meant to
“attract, retain and motivate” (Greenbury,
1995: section 1.10) and human resource man-
agement issues were a key part of remunera-
tion strategy. A scheme that had not paid out,
and showed little chance of paying out, was
seen as being a poor motivator, and as pos-
sibly failing to retain good directors.
And if you were in a plan where [there] was no
possibility of payment even if you were just
below median, then the view was taken that this
isn’t working as an incentive or a handcuff, and
it is demotivating. (Consultant 2)
Then the message is coming through loud and
clear that they have the long-term incentive that
is not incentivising. So when you then get a
response from the executives which is reinforc-
ing those sort of messages, you don’t have to be
a rocket scientist to work out that you need to
do something. (Comp 1)
During the interviews, I put forward an
agency theory argument that the schemes had
not paid out because performance had been
less than required, and so the participants
should not really expect to receive a payment
that was not deserved. The response to this
was that although that is what the logic of the
situation might demand, it was felt that the
individuals still needed to be motivated and
retained, and that the pay award was a way to
do this. HR 2 explained it as follows:
Really, it [the long-term scheme] fell into disre-
pute as a means of remunerating people, because
it did not pay out for two, and then three years.
People just looked at it negatively. The fact that
the company had not performed even at median
level when compared with its peers in terms of
total shareholder return was not something that
they were focusing on. (HR 2)
In response to the same point, about payment
not being deserved, NXD 2 responded in the
context of another company with which he
was connected, in which the executive share
options were underwater:6
Oh, that is an argument that is put, but I don’t
think that it carries you very much further
forward. You could say that they’ve gone so far
underwater that the management doesn’t
deserve it. You could say that the management
should therefore be sacked, you should find a
new management. And there is a bit of that, I’m
sure. But every day is the first day of the rest of
our lives. (NXD 2)
The thrust of his argument was that having got
into that situation, the management needed to
be encouraged to bring the company out of it.
This view was reflected by several of the inter-
viewees, although views on how to address
the issue, for example by repricing options,
were polarised, with some interviewees in
favour, and most very much against.
Views such as those expressed by NXD 2
would seem to conflict with the traditional
view of performance related pay set out by
proponents of agency theory. Paying the 
executives despite their not achieving per-
formance targets conflicts with the agency
view of using remuneration to encourage them
to act in accordance with shareholders’ wishes
as expressed in the remuneration contract: the
sanction of performance-related pay is dimin-
ished if the executives are reasonably con-
fident that incentives will be reinstated
regardless of performance.
Strategic reasons
The other reason given for changing the long-
term incentive schemes was that both compa-
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nies had changed their corporate strategy in
recent years, and it was felt that the remu-
neration policy had to be amended in order 
to support the change in corporate strategy.
This link of remuneration with strategy was
substantiated by the fact that the two compa-
nies, apparently facing a similar, heavily regu-
lated environment, had chosen very different
remuneration policies. Each had the tradi-
tional components of salary, short-term and
long-term performance-related elements, but
the way they configured these components
was very different. At first sight this made
little sense, but during the course of the inter-
views the very different strategic aims they
were following (for example, their different
approaches towards diversification) became
apparent, and it was clear how the chosen
remuneration schemes fitted in with these
strategies.
Consultant 1 explained the change in
scheme for Utility 1 in these terms:
The output of the process, the committee felt,
and I wouldn’t disagree with it, was that the
new arrangements better suited the company’s
then-current structure and focus. They went
through what I think is a fairly typical process.
They deliberated fairly long and hard on the
needs of the business first of all. (Consultant 1)
HR 1 explained that considerable thought had
gone into devising an appropriate remunera-
tion strategy. He pointed out that the core
business, being a utility, was relatively risk-
free compared to, say, running a dot.com, and
so the remuneration packages had to reflect
that. However, he noted that the risk was
much higher in some of the group’s unregu-
lated activities, and this part of the business
merited a different reward structure. He
explained that at the very top of the business
(the focus of this research), the collective
responsibility of the board meant that board
executives’ pay was not highly differentiated
to reflect these different businesses; but at the
levels immediately below the board the situa-
tion was different:
Underneath the top people, there’s quite a degree
of variety. We’ve changed every remuneration
policy in the group over the last two years.
Every single one. And that’s to reflect the diver-
sity of the markets we work in. (HR 1)
In Utility 2, it was also clear that the group’s
strategy had a clear impact on the remunera-
tion policies adopted:
That’s the strategic intent . . . and so that too
was part of the decision-making process, to
ensure that the new arrangements took account
of the new strategic intent. (HR 2)
And
There was a recognition among the executive
that if we were going to change direction, then
remuneration had to be reviewed as part of that
change of direction. (HR 2)
HR 2 went on to explain how the company’s
business would develop further over the next
two to three years, as the strategy was gradu-
ally realised. He suggested that the remu-
neration strategy would have to be adapted
further at that time, better to reflect these new
circumstances.
In both companies the type of scheme
chosen and the performance measures
adopted were designed to focus the actions of
the directors, and to send clear signals
throughout the organisation as to what was
expected from the new strategy. As discussed
earlier, proponents of contingency theory
suggest that there needs to be alignment
between a company’s strategy and its remu-
neration policies. Balkin and Gomez-Mejia
(1987) take the view that effectiveness at real-
ising intended strategies depends significantly
on the existence of a match among strategy,
organisation and environment. This view was
borne out in the sentiments expressed in the
interviews, and the intent in the two compa-
nies to tailor their remuneration strategies to
suit the corporate context.
The choice of the form of the long-term
remuneration scheme
As explained earlier, a standard executive
remuneration package in the UK will include
an element of variable pay based on long-term
performance. Accordingly to Langley (1997)
that long-term incentive has three aims: to
reward executives, to retain them and to rein-
force company strategy. In practice, long-term
incentive schemes tend to fall into two types:
executive share option schemes, and other
schemes, known generically as long-term
incentive plans, or ltips (New Bridge Street
Consultants, 2002a). Within the constraints of
their strategic imperatives, companies have to
determine whether to adopt an option scheme,
an ltip, or both.
An executive share option scheme awards
the executive a number of call options on the
shares of the company, which can be exercised
during some future period, normally between
three and ten years after the grant date.
Common practice in the UK is that the exer-
cise price of the options will be the same as the
share price at the date of grant. It is also cus-
tomary in the UK for executive share options
to be exercisable only on the achievement of 
a performance condition, often growth in
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earnings per share (eps) over the period (New
Bridge Street Consultants, 2002a).
Ltips may take a variety of forms. Generally,
there will be an immediate award of shares to
the executive; however, these shares will not
vest until some time in the future, provided
that certain performance conditions have 
been met. A majority of UK companies using
ltips use comparative total shareholder return
(TSR) as their performance condition (New
Bridge Street Consultants, 2002a). This 
measures the company’s percentage return 
to shareholders over the period (share price
changes plus dividends) compared to that in 
a comparator group; the ultimate level of
vesting depends on how highly ranked the
company is in relation to its comparator
group.
The literature on executive remuneration
clearly sets out the advantages and disadvan-
tages of share option schemes as opposed to
other types of long-term performance incen-
tive. For example, Hall (1997) points out 
the advantages of options, whereas Yermack
(1997) illustrates some of their problems.
Bender and Porter (2001) discuss the different
features of the various plans, and conclude
that there is no one correct answer to suit all 
circumstances.
Outside the academic arena, survey evi-
dence indicates trends in remuneration
schemes in FTSE 350 companies that have
moved from the use of options to ltips and
back to options (New Bridge Street Consul-
tants, 2002a). Institutional theory might
provide one explanation for this trend. The
move from options to ltips in the mid-1990s
followed the Myners report (1995) and the
Greenbury report (1995), both of which
pointed out the flaws in share option schemes.
This perhaps reflects coercive isomorphism.
However, companies have found ltips very
complex (PIRC, 1998; Pricewaterhouse
Coopers, 2001), and a trickle of companies
changing back to an option for good practical
reasons has become a steady flow as others
follow, a mimetic trend. Such an institutional
theory hypothesis is supported by comments
of one of the consultants:
. . . option schemes amongst public companies
are now back in favour, as it were. (Consultant)
The remark that options are “in favour” sug-
gests that there was no clear logical reason for
adopting this form of incentive (and this was
borne out in the rest of that discussion), but
that the remuneration committee was merely
adopting a scheme similar to its peers.
In practice, both remuneration committees
appear to have followed their individual pref-
erences (or the preferences of their dominant
members – this could not be determined) in
deciding which type of scheme to adopt.
So there are pros and cons [between options and
ltips]. But I think it is fair to say that the
members of the remuneration committee all
favour options. (CEO)
We come to personal wishes. . . . I think there
was a general feeling amongst the non-exec
members of the board that share options were
not the flavour of the moment. (NXD)
I queried this NXD on his comment about
options not being the flavour of the month,
since, as mentioned above, surveys seem to
show that they are becoming more popular
again. He said that the matter had not been
subject to great debate, and that the commit-
tee members had felt it more appropriate to go
for something that demanded a higher hurdle
rate than options normally have.
This raises another interesting point, regard-
ing the performance measures used in options
and ltips. As stated earlier, it is common for
share options to use a performance measure
based on growth in eps, and ltips to use a per-
formance measure based on TSR. However,
there is nothing intrinsic to either scheme
which states that these measures must be used,
and indeed there are many examples of 
companies doing differently. Nevertheless, the
comments of this NXD, and those of the con-
sultant who advised that committee, clearly
show that one reason why the ltip was
adopted in preference to an option was that
TSR was seen to be a more appropriate target
than eps. In the other utility, which imple-
mented an option scheme with an eps target,
the Chairman made the following comment
when asked why the scheme was chosen:
It is a matter of philosophy, isn’t it. Both in
terms of your view on what the most appropri-
ate performance indicator is – is it total share-
holder return or eps? – and we could sit here for
the next two days arguing about it and not come
to a conclusion. (Chairman)
Again, his reply to a question about the choice
of an option versus an ltip revolved around
the use of eps growth versus TSR.
In this context it is worth pointing out that
the use of eps growth as a performance
measure is fraught with difficulties for regu-
lated utilities, whose profits are reduced by the
periodic review every five years. Companies
implementing such a scheme have to ensure
that it is acceptable to the executives whose
retention and motivation it is designed to
encourage.
Finally, it was also worthy of note that one
of the non-executives interviewed served in an
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executive capacity in another company, in a
very different industry, whose long-term
scheme was very similar to that introduced
into the utility. I suggested to him that perhaps
the similarity of the schemes had been under
his influence. He pointed out that the two
companies share a remuneration consultant,
and suggested that perhaps was the other
obvious place to look as regards similarities in
schemes. This could be an example of norma-
tive isomorphism.
The use of market comparators
Companies tend to set their executive remu-
neration in line with “the market”. As well as
the obvious connection to labour market
theory, this could have two social-psychologi-
cal explanations. By using market rates the
companies can be seen to be satisfying their
executives that they are being fairly treated (an
equity theory explanation) and legitimising
their remuneration in the eyes of stakeholders.
In this section, the two main forms of market
comparator – for salary and for TSR – are 
discussed.
Paying the “market rate” for salaries
In both of the companies, the consultants had
prepared detailed reports that were used to
benchmark the executives’ pay against com-
parators, and in both cases these reflected
three sets of comparators: companies in the
specific utilities sector, companies in their
FTSE index and companies whose businesses
reflected the non-regulated businesses of the
case study companies. These three sets of
benchmarks were available for each top execu-
tive position, giving a lot of data on which 
the decision could be based. This use of
market benchmarks suggests that the econo-
mists’ concept of paying wages to reflect the
marginal contribution of an individual (as dis-
cussed by Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) has no
direct place in the practice of setting directors’
remuneration, and that the practice of paying
“the market” is institutionalised, perhaps
reflecting labour market theory.
An interesting finding of the research was
that although all of the participants stated 
that their remuneration was driven by “the
market”, they could not clarify exactly what
“the market” was or how it worked. Answers
to questions about exactly what drove either
the level of pay or the detail of its structure 
(for example, how many options were to be
awarded each year, what level of bonus
should be available) inevitably cited market
practice. However, over time, market practices
have changed, both in terms of the amounts
paid and in the way schemes have been struc-
tured (New Bridge Street Consultants, 2002a,
2002b). Logically, something must have
caused that change. However, questions about
“what drives the market” or “who is the
market” tended to be deflected into answers
about the specific market comparators that the
companies used at that time.
This bears out comments made by Barkema
and Gomez-Mejia:
An important concern in this regard is how to
define the market. The relevant market is an
abstraction that exists in people’s mind. . . .
When a firm decides to pay executives the going
rate in the CEO market, it must first decide on
the appropriate “comparison others” in the
market. Making this choice is a social and 
political process that may not be subject to
explanation on economic grounds. (Barkema
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 141)
Such views were echoed by one of the 
interviewees:
And we use the term “labour market” generally
as if there was such a thing as a labour market.
Truly, the definition or the terminology “labour
market” is shorthand for a plethora of different
markets. (Consultant 1)
And later in the same discussion, he expanded
upon this line of thought:
Firstly let us identify what we mean by market
practice. We use the phrase too carefully. We
assume that there is one market position, let’s
take job X, that there is a market position for
base salary, there’s a market position for bonus
opportunity, and there’s a market position for
either option grants or real share award scheme
awards. There isn’t. (Consultant 1)
He went on to explain that typically in a
market there will be a range of plus or minus
20 per cent or 25 per cent between quartiles.
Furthermore, it was explained in the same
context by Comp 1 that even if a company is
adopting a “median” remuneration policy,
most will flex at more than plus or minus 10
per cent from that figure. Nevertheless, “the
market” is used as the benchmark to deter-
mine executive remuneration and the levels of
bonus and long-term award. During the
course of this line of questioning, comments
such as the following were typical:
Well, looking at their competitors I couldn’t see
that it was driven by market practice. (Consul-
tant 2)
The above comment was in answer to a ques-
tion as to why the company had not adopted
a particular alternative policy, and it is that
alternative policy which was not market 
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practice – the policy actually adopted was seen
as market practice. And in the course of the
same conversation, in answer to a question on
why he had said that a particular level of
bonus cap was “not generous” he replied:
You can only measure these things relative to
other companies. It’s very difficult question to
answer. (Consultant 2)
Consultant 1 took a very philosophical
approach to the discussions:
Because there are no absolute rights. I mean,
there is no such thing as overpaying, or under-
paying executives as an absolute; there is only
overpaying or underpaying based on some com-
parative judgement. And we all bring different
forms of comparative judgement. (Consultant 1)
The quotations above all cite consultants
because they provided the fullest description
of this process, and because they are the ones
making recommendations to the remunera-
tion committee. However, all of the respon-
dents made similar comments.
The processes reported here can be linked to
theory in many ways. The first and most
obvious is the connection to labour market
theory. Ezzamel and Watson (1998) refer to the
need to pay “the going rate” to executives in
order to motivate and retain them, and one
purpose of the consultants’ reports is clearly to
identify what this going rate might be. Sec-
ondly, in line with the comment by Barkema
and Gomez-Mejia, quoted above, the decision
as to which market to use is not obvious, as
illustrated by the consultants’ apparent need
to provide three separate sets of figures to each
company. Finally, the findings also support
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) in their com-
ments about isomorphic pressures influencing
industry-wide remuneration levels.
It is also worth considering the process in
terms of two aspects of decision theory – the
anchoring heuristic and bounded rationality.
As regards bounded rationality, it seems self-
evident that the remuneration committees did
not seek all possible information on the subject
(for example, they only sought the detailed
views of one firm of consultants; they only
looked at three sets of comparators). Further-
more, the interviewees indicated that the HR
professionals prepared and collated a great
amount of information, of which only sum-
maries, in accordance with normal commercial
practice, were given to the committees.
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume
that a satisficing decision was made.
It also seems reasonable to assume that the
anchoring heuristic influenced the decisions. It
was not possible to determine precisely how
the remuneration committees determined the
exact number for directors’ remuneration; to
do that, it would have been necessary to sit in
at the relevant meetings. However, on the
basis that the final remuneration figures were
of a similar size to the figures produced by the
consultants, it would be reasonable to assume
that the consultants’ reports had anchored the
committees’ judgement. It would also seem
likely that the remuneration in previous years
also acted as an anchor in each company.
Indeed, that was borne out by one of the HR
directors, who described the pay regime
earlier in the company’s history as “. . . every-
body gets inflation. Full stop”. This regime
had led after a few years to salaries at the
company being out of line with the market,
and dissatisfaction by the executives had been
one factor leading to realignment with market
levels.
A final link to theory relates to the use of
consultants to produce the market data. As
stated earlier, companies need their remuner-
ation practices to be seen to be legitimate in
the constituencies on which they rely. One
way to demonstrate legitimacy is to rely on
external providers, who are presumably inde-
pendent. The consultants’ part in legitimising
the actions of the remuneration committee is
noted by Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998, 
p. 141) who refer to remuneration decisions
“involving judgements of the committee
members, legitimized by the opinions of 
external consultants”. This was illustrated in
various ways by the interviewees:
But I do think, there is no doubt that part of this
process is a covering of the back. It allows the
board to say that it has consulted with consul-
tants. (NXD 2)
We chose, in the interests of self-preservation, to
rely heavily on the external advice . . . (HR 1)
Determining suitable comparators for TSR
The issue of choosing comparator companies
features in two places in the remuneration
decision. As discussed above, the “market
rate” means that an appropriate market needs
to be selected. Also, most ltips use compara-
tive TSR (total shareholder return) over a
period as the performance benchmark, which
means that comparator companies need to be
selected against whom it is reasonable to
compare performance.
For both of the case study companies, there
was a problem in choosing comparator com-
panies. Part of this problem was a very prac-
tical one: as utilities, one obvious comparator
group is other utilities. However, over the last
three years, the number of utilities listed on
the London Stock Exchange has fallen consid-
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erably, due to takeovers and mergers. As the
utility pool becomes smaller, it is more diffi-
cult to use these companies as comparators.
This was expressed by Consultant 2:
Let’s say you start off with ten companies in a
comparator group. Within six months a couple
of them have been taken over. You then get down
to three or four. Now, how do you measure
median and upper decile with three or four com-
parators? It just becomes meaningless. What
happens if you have a takeover or a merger? Do
the schemes pay out, or do you measure up to
the date of the takeover? A lot of them pay out
in full, and that’s given rise to a lot of problems.
(Consultant 2)
On that same point, Comp 1 pointed out that
if weaker companies have been taken over,
such takeovers are likely to have been at a
premium to their share prices, thus raising the
return to their shareholders. He asked, rhetori-
cally, if it was equitable that these artificially
high returns should be the benchmark against
which the continuing companies are judged.
This could be seen as a link back to equity
theory (Adams, 1963), in that the executives
need to believe that they are being paid fairly,
and in line with the pay of their peers.
The influence of history
Remuneration policies are not set in a vacuum,
and one source of the influences which impact
a company’s choice of policies may be the
events of its past (Gomez-Mejia, 1994, p. 206).
As mentioned earlier, the history of directors’
remuneration in UK utilities is one of “fat 
cat” jibes and governmental disapproba-
tion. Despite the fact that the event which 
set off much of this debate, the 75 per cent 
pay increase awarded to Cedric Brown at
British Gas, took place in 1994 (Sunday Times,
11 May 1995), evidence of their effects 
was clear in both case study companies. This
came through in the need to legitimise the
company’s remuneration policies, for example
by using consultants, and in the types of 
packages set.
I think that one is also a bit sensitive of the back-
ground here as a privatised utility. . . . so they
would come under more scrutiny . . . you’ve got
to take that into account. (Consultant 2)
. . . had gone through a period of . . . being in
the public eye with a focus on pay. So that has
an impact. You have a historical impact. There’s
a reaction. (Consultant 1)
There is history in all of this. You can’t detach
the way the people are paid from the cultural
background of the business. (CEO 1)
There’s quite a lot of history to this, it does go
back to the days of the fat cattery. . . . There was
a very kind of matter of fact recognition that pay
restraint was the order of the day. (HR 1)
The influence of history could also be seen in
the example cited above of salary levels in one
of the companies being limited to inflationary
rises. In discussions with the directors, it
became clear that this too was in reaction to
adverse publicity received in the days of the
“fat cats”. Even though none of the current
remuneration committee had been associated
with the company at that time, corporate
memory appeared to live on, evidenced in the
need to legitimise the company’s remunera-
tion policies.
Discussion and conclusions
The main concern of this paper has been to put
forward a preliminary analysis of the qualita-
tive empirical research into how the remuner-
ation of executive directors is determined.
Data gathered in 11 interviews at two case
study companies have been analysed to deter-
mine the reasons that the companies changed
their remuneration policies and the strategic
factors they considered in making those
changes.
One important outcome of the research is
that it demonstrates that the remuneration
policies were devised in the context of the
company. This was shown in two ways. The
choice of corporate strategy had a clear influ-
ence on the remuneration policies selected, as
the remuneration committee and its advisors
tried to align the remuneration policies with
the strategic imperatives of the company. The
fact that two superficially similar companies
ended up with two very different remunera-
tion policies, based on their strategies, demon-
strates this. Furthermore, the impact of the
companies’ history on their choice of remu-
neration levels and policies can also be seen as
a contextual issue.
A significant debate in the field of directors’
remuneration is between the relative advan-
tages and disadvantages of executive share
options and other long-term incentive plans.
This research offers some understanding of
how companies choose between the two. It has
shown that companies are aware of the fea-
tures of each, but that in the case study 
companies the decision as to which to use 
was taken in part based on the individual 
preferences of the remuneration committee
members. An institutional theory approach
was also influential here, in two ways. Firstly,
in the comments made about adopting 
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particular schemes because that is what others
were doing; and secondly in the arguments
which seemed to equate the type of scheme
(options, ltip) with the most common perfor-
mance measure associated therewith (eps
growth, TSR).
Companies adopt different types of scheme
at least in part because they follow what other
companies are doing. The influence of other
companies is also shown in the level of pay
that is selected – which is generally based on
“the market”. The research shows that there
are two separate “markets” used by compa-
nies in setting remuneration. In determining
an appropriate level of salaries, companies
refer to a market comprising companies in the
same sector, or in the same FTSE grouping,
and use salary data from these comparators in
order to establish where their own salaries
should lie. A separate market, much smaller, is
used to establish comparators for determining
how well the company has done in TSR terms
when evaluating awards for the ltip. In both
cases, the protagonists appreciate the limita-
tions of the market they have used.
Finally, the limitations of this study must be
acknowledged. It is a small study, with only 11
interviews conducted in two companies.
Further interviews in more companies need to
be undertaken, and indeed this work is cur-
rently underway. Having said that, it is worth
noting that, as well as the remuneration con-
sultants, who obviously have very wide ex-
perience, the executives and non-executives
interviewed between them have explicit
knowledge of current remuneration practices
in many other companies, which has extended
the scope of the study.
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Notes
1. There is even a section in the Greenbury report
– section 8 – relating specifically to privatised
utilities.
2. As research access was conditional on maintain-
ing the anonymity of the companies and the
interviewees, no details are given about the busi-
ness strategies adopted by the companies, their
specific remuneration policies, nor the amounts
paid to their directors. Further, where necessary
some company-specific information has been
disguised.
3. In each company, the executives and remunera-
tion committee members between them held
more than six other current directorships in
listed companies, and had been involved at
director level at more than 12 other listed com-
panies in the last five years.
4. In one company the interview was with the 
outgoing consultant, in the other it was with 
the incoming consultant. In both cases these
were the individuals who had advised on the
remuneration policy and packages in the latest
published accounts.
5. The term “Chairman” is used regardless of the
gender of the individual.
6. Share options are known as “underwater” if the
option exercise price is higher than the current
share price, meaning that it would not be worth-
while to exercise the option at that time.
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